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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
1892) 51 F. 506; In re Shults (D. C. W. D. N. Y. 1904) 132 F. 573; Bank of
Anderson v. Majeski (1929) 149 S. C. 178, 146 S. E. 815; but cf. Bank v.
Armstrong (1893) 146 U. S. 499 (where the set-off was denied because the
note did not mature until after the insolvency of the bank). A similar re-
sult was reached in an early Missouri case on the ground that the subse-
quent insolvency of the bank should not be allowed to impair a right which
had vested in the indorser prior thereto. Stephens v. Schumann (1883) 32
Mo. App. 333. These cases seem largely oblivious of the fact that by allow-
ing the indorser such a right of set-off when the maker is solvent, the in-
dorser can obtain the full value of his deposit while the other depositors may
receive liquidating dividends equal to only a small proportion of theirs. It
is true that there may be a similar preference even where the maker is in-
solvent if he pays a greater proportion of his liabilities than the bank, but
the amount of the preference involved will probably be much less than if
the maker was solvent. However, it would unduly delay the administration of
justice to postpone the allowance of the set-off until it could be ascertained
exactly what proportion of his debts the maker was able to pay.
It is fair to conclude that the modern and realistic tendency is towards the
adoption of the rule laid down by the present case. It may be hoped that
when the question is again presented to them the Missouri courts will refuse
to follow the undesirable rule of the Stephens case. P. R., '34.
DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT-TIME LIMIT FOR A VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL.-
During the course of argument on a demurrer to the evidence, the counsel
for the plaintiff decided that the trial judge was about to sustain the de-
murrer to the evidence. The plaintiff then attempted to take a voluntary
nonsuit, so as to avoid a ruling which would have been res adjudicata and
would prevent the bringing of another suit. The Supreme Court of Okla-
homa held that this motion was made too late under an Oklahoma statute
which restricted the right to take a nonsuit to any time before the case is
"finally submitted to the jury, or to the court where the trial is by the court".
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Reynolds (Okla. 1932) 12 Pac.
(2d.) 208; C. S. Okla. (1921) sec. 664.
At common law the plaintiff could take a nonsuit at any time, even after
the jury had reached a verdict against him, but if the plaintiff took a non-
suit he must pay costs and was theoretically liable to be amerced to the King.
3 Bl. Comm. *376-377. This right has been greatly limited by modern statutes,
which, however, vary considerably in their terminology. Missouri and
many other states have statutes which are substantially identical with the
quoted language from the Oklahoma act. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 960. In
New York the statute is more definite in jury cases, since it allows such a
motion at any time before the case is "committed to the jury to consider the
verdict". Since all these statutes are in derogation of the common law they
should not be extended beyond their express terms. National Bank v. Butler
(1912) 163 Mo. App. 380. 143 S. W. 1117; Crane v. Leclere (1927) 204 Iowa
1087, 216 N. W. 622.
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Under the type statute existing in Missouri, there is hopeless conflict as to
the last moment at which a nonsuit may be voluntarily taken. 18 C. J. 1156;
note (1932) 79 A. L. R. 688. As the principal case states it can certainly be
taken at any time before a demurrer to the evidence or a motion for a directed
verdict has been filed. Equally clearly, it cannot be taken after the jury has
retired to consider its verdict. Suess v. Motz (1926) 220 Mo. App. 32, 285
S. W. 775; De Phillips v. Neslin (1930) 155 Wash. 147; 283 Pac. 691. In
Ohio it has been ruled to be too late after a motion for a directed verdict has
been made, even though the judge has not yet even considered the motion.
Jacob Lamb Baking Co. v. Middleton (1928) 118 Ohio St. 106, 160 N. E. 629.
Kansas agrees with Oklahoma in holding that the question depends whether
the judge has intimated how he will rule on the motion. Cott v. Baker (1922)
112 Kan. 115, 210 Pac. 651. However, the weight of authority is that a
motion to dismiss may be made even after the judge has ruled on the motion
for a directed verdict or the demurrer to the evidence. Scgall v. Garlichs
(1926) 313 Mo. 406, 281 S. W. 693; Pitt v. Abrams (Fla. 1931) 139 So. 152;
Daube v. Kuppenheimer (1916) 272 Ill. 350, 112 N. E. 61; Darby V. Pidgeon
Thomas Iron Co. (Tenn. 1921) 232 S. W. 75; Fentress & Co. v. Young
(C. C. A. 8, 1931) 55 F. (2d) 53 (applying a Wisconsin statute).
If a trial judge should grant a motion to dismiss which was made too late,
there is no effective remedy available to the defendant in a jury case unless
the jury has already brought in a verdict for the defendant. The jury will
have disbanded and cannot be reconvened. Suess v. Motz, supra. Obviously
when a verdict has once been rendered, the trial judge cannot grant a mo-
tion for a new trial merely to allow the plaintiff to file a motion for a non-
suit. Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing Co. v. Gordon (1903) 173 Mo. 139,
73 S. W. 155.
It would seem that the ruling in the present case unduly restricted the
right to take a nonsuit. The arguments on a motion for a directed verdict
or a demurrer to the evidence may show the plaintiff's counsel how to remedy
the fatal weakness in his case by securing additional evidence. Yet, the
lawyer may easily not discover this until the judge has intimated how he
will rule on the motion for a directed verdict or the demurrer to the evidence.
The moral of this case is that if the plaintiff must have a stupid lawyer, he
might just as well have a stubborn one, for the lawyer will not be allowed to
correct his mistakes after they have been pointed out to him. It would also
seem very difficult in practice, particularly on appeal, to determine whether
or not the trial judge had given some intimation of how he was going to rule
on the motion for a directed verdict or the demurrer to the evidence.
G. W. S., '33.
NEGLIGENCE-HuiANITARIAN RuL---DuTY OFWATCHFULNESS-The plain-
tiff, a member of the St. Louis Police force, was run over by a steam roller.
It was admitted that he was contributarily negligent in standing in the area
being rolled while directing traffic so as to keep it off of the part of the street
being repaved. 'The driver of the roller did not see the plaintiff. An in-
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